Celtic – as expected – continue to control SPFL matches through early goals thus enabling them to keep opponents at arm’s length from there on in.

Six goals by the 20th minute of the four matches played, and eight by the 40th minute have seen Celtic use game state to their advantage. This means that teams setting up defensively to frustrate Brendan Rodgers’ charges have their game plans disrupted early and must either adapt and introduce greater risk or continue to hunker down and allow Celtic mastery of the ball at their leisure. It is a nasty trap to fall into.

Celtic have been able to pick and choose when to attack without overly risking transitions by overcommitting players into the final third. The statistics ‘suffer’ slightly. No need to pile up shot after shot and take risks in the final third when faced with such a game state. Hence, Celtic are averaging 2.53 xG for in the four matches thus far. Not too shabby - and less than the three goals averaged per game - but you always feel there is more. The flip side is that teams losing early goals know from the outset they need to trouble Celtic. The trouble is, that has barely happened.

Last season, Celtic averaged near on one xG against per game across all competitions. This season that is a paltry 0.35.  Much like in Ange Postecoglou’s second season, Celtic’s relentlessness in and out of possession has been so draining for the opposition to deal with that they cannot muster the energy for sustained attacks. Even then, Postecoglou’s team averaged 0.99 xG against over the season.

Rodgers’ style is more control-orientated. There is slightly less risk in numbers deployed forward and in the aggression of the forward passing. But the low xG against is not just a function of greater ball control nor even what may turn out to be an upgrade in the goalkeeper. Kasper Schmeichel has faced 1.09 xG on target and conceded one goal from five efforts. All fine but he hasn’t been deployed because the opposition has barely been close enough to muster any material efforts.

I pointed out last season that Celtic are pressing and counter-pressing MORE aggressively under Rodgers than Postecoglou. Pressures per 90 minutes went up from 60.97 to 72.89. Counter-pressures were up from 24.29 to 27.18. Let’s look at the St. Mirren game as an example.

Hold the press

A reminder of the StatsBomb definitions.

  • A counter-pressure is applying pressure to the ball holder within five seconds of a turnover.
  • A pressure is simply pressurising the opposition ball holder.
  • A regain is when the ball is won back within five seconds of pressure or counter-pressure.

Against the Buddies, Celtic had 76 per cent possession and so naturally applied less volume of pressure. Celtic applied 135 to the home side’s 154. However Celtic regained the ball from those pressures 32 times compared to the Saints 29. That is, 24 per cent of Celtic pressures resulted in regaining the ball. Whilst only 19 per cent of St Mirren’s efforts were similarly successful. Better players can play more successfully under pressure.

The pressing maps are instructive on Celtic’s strengths and weaknesses.

You will notice that pressing actions are concentrated in the wide areas. Pressing teams recognise the touchline as an extra defender. That is, the opponent must play within the bounds of the field, and so in essence, when a player has the ball near the touchline, his passing options are already limited by geography.

Similarly, when facing a press in central midfield, the opponent has 360 degrees of choice available to beat the press. Hence, a key trigger for pressing action is an opponent ‘trapped’ with the ball near the touchline.

One of the benefits of Paulo Bernardo in the new post-Matt O’Riley era (I’m not crying) is that the Portuguese is an athletic presser in midfield and the area central and bottom left is his zone. In the top left is the Daizen Maeda zone. He accounted for 22 of Celtic’s pressures, six more than the next highest Celt.

Here are the pressing volumes from the game.

Reo Hatate had an excellent match with the ball, setting up five chances, scoring a memorable back-to-front team goal with impeccable technique, and leading the team in expected scoring contribution. He also had 16 pressures, the second most in the team.

From those on the Celtic right-hand side (Alistair Johnston, Cameron Carter-Vickers, Bernardo, James Forrest, Odin Thiago Holm and Nicolas Kuhn) we saw 55 pressures applied. From the left (Greg Taylor, Liam Scales, Hatate, Daizen Maeda, Tony Ralston, Francis Turley) we saw 56 but 22 of them were from Maeda and 16 from Hatate (68 per cent).

It was great to see Hatate take responsibility following O’Riley’s departure, but Celtic perhaps needs greater pressing activity from the left-sided defenders – Taylor and Scales.

Counter-claims

The counter-pressing map is as follows:

Celtic’s right-sided bias as regards counter-pressing is stark granted the Maeda phenomenon on the top left. Here are the volumes:

Celtic saw 16 counter presses from the right and 14 from the left. Counter-pressing is more of a reactive activity where players must make personal decisions regarding the triggers. That then must be backed up with athleticism and speed. What the heatmaps show in both cases is the difference in intensity of the pressures from the right relative to the left. The volumes may be identical but the quality of the pressing indicates a greater difference.

Celtic forced more packing turnovers (turnover the ball leading to your players being taken out of the game) from the St Mirren left. Left-sided centre-back Richard Taylor, left wing-back Jaden Brown and left-sided midfielder Mark O’Hara lost six of those compared to one from their right-sided colleagues. This is nitpicking in a sense. What we are seeing, given the loanees turned permanents were here last year, is that the ten outfield players are demonstrating cohesion and understanding borne from good coaching and familiarity.

Nevertheless, the pressing data highlights that whilst the team is executing the pressing triggers as befitting the cohesion/understanding – these are decisions with seconds of decision-making available. Counter-pressing requires sub-second responses and individual decision making and it is here we see some convergence of performance between the right side and the left.

Small details but those become big issues when stressed at the Champions League level. Nothing you don’t know already, but a reminder of the detail behind the reasons to strengthen that part of the team.